This paper develops an approach to studying how bias in favor of one party due to the pattern of electoral districting a¤ects policy choice.
Introduction
One of the central issues in political economy is to understand how electoral incentives shape economic policy outcomes. The dominant model of party competition following Downs (1957) models the consequences of parties competing for votes by making policy promises. The benchmark median voter result suggests that it is voters' preferences rather than political institutions that determine policy outcomes.
The new generation of political economy research gives more weight to how institutions a¤ect policy. This paper focuses on one important institution -the design of the electoral system. It looks speci…cally at how districting bias in favor of a party a¤ects electoral incentives and policy outcomes. The paper develops a theoretical approach and an empirical application. En route, it discusses how data on the relationship between seats and votes can be incorporated into the study of policy formation.
The basic framework adopted is one in which two parties compete for election by o¤ering policy platforms in a majoritarian electoral system. Voters are either partisan (committed to a particular party) or independent. The latter, which we refer to as swing voters, play a key role in determining election outcomes as parties compete for their voters with their platform choices. Voters are distributed across districts which are heterogeneous, containing di¤erent fractions of partisan and swing voters. Such heterogeneity can either be by design, as in the case of partisan gerrymandering, or due to constraints imposed by geography or history.
The distribution of voters across districts a¤ects the way in which votes are translated into seats. A uniform distribution of partisan and swing voters across districts implies that a party will win seats in proportion to its vote share.
An electoral system is said to be biased in favor of one party in so far as an equal split of the votes between the parties translates into an unequal division of the seats. As we discuss further in the next section, there is a large empirical literature on the measurement of this kind of bias.
Parties must decide how far to formulate their platforms to please their core (partisan) supporters or appeal to swing voters. The key focus for party strategy is the location of the median district, i.e. the one that they need to win in order to have a majority of seats. If the core support of a party is concentrated, then the median district will be easier to win as a smaller proportion of swing voters will need to be won over in order to win the election. A key insight of the paper is to show that the extent of core support in the median district is equivalent to a statement about bias in the electoral system. This provides a link between the theory of electoral strategy and the empirical study of the relationship between seats and votes.
The theory suggests an empirical approach that we illustrate using English local government data. The estimation strategy is recursive. First we estimate the bias in the electoral system. We then relate this measure of bias to policy outcomes. The results suggest that electoral bias in favor of a party leads to more extreme policy outcomes, i.e. those that favor its core supporters.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section relates the paper to a number of literatures in economics and political science. Section four develops the theoretical approach. Section three links this to the seatvotes relationship implied by the model and states our main result. In section …ve we develop an application. Section six concludes.
Related Literature
This paper pulls together ideas from three distinct literatures: models of voting with a mixture of partisan and swing voters, the empirical relationship between seats and votes, and strategic models of party competition. We brie ‡y review how this paper relates to each.
A world comprising partisan and swing voters is a central tenet of the Michigan election studies beginning in the U.S. in the 1950s. 1 Partisans are core supporters who are strongly committed to a given party while swing voters are those whose party attachment is weak. While the nature of partisan attachment in this framework is still much debated (see, for example, Green et al (2004) ), the basic idea remains relevant and most survey data collected on voters and voting behavior uses these categories to classify the electorate. This approach is straightforwardly combined with a probabilistic voting model of the kind that is now popular in the political economy literature (see, for example, Persson and Tabellini (2000)).
As we noted above, there is a long-standing interest in political science in modeling the empirical relationship between seats and votes. 2 For a two-party system, this can be represented in general by a seats-votes curve -a real value function mapping the share of the votes received by one party, denoted here by P , into its share of the seats, denoted by S which we write as S = f (P ). An electoral system is said to be biased when f The existing political economy literature on electoral systems (for example Tabellini (2003, 2004) ) has tended to adopt a rules driven approach to classifying an electoral system. The seats-votes curve suggests a di¤erent way of looking at this, focusing on bias and responsiveness.
Given that data on seats and votes are in plentiful supply, there has been a lot of interest in measuring f (P ) empirically and the implied bias and responsiveness. Traditionally this has been done by specifying a functional form for f (P ) and estimating its parameters. A popular model is:
In this case, the parameter represents bias while represents responsiveness.
Perfect proportional representation is given by = 0 and = 1. Majoritarian electoral systems typically yield > 1 and to the extent that districting favors one party, then 6 = 0.
The empirical model in (1) has a long history. Kendall and Stewart (1950) famously postulated the "cube law" for British elections where = 3. The model is developed further in Gelman and King (1994a,b), Quandt (1974) and King (1989) . King and Browning (1987) estimate this model on U.S. data.
Gelman and King (1994a), among others, have emphasized that bias in the 2 For an overview, see Taagepera and Shugart (1989) .
electoral system is a¤ected by the way in which the boundaries of districts are drawn.
The curve f (P ) has not featured to date in theoretical models of partisan politics. In part, this is because, it is has no clear "micro-foundations". This paper shows how the relationship f (P ) can be derived in general from an underlying model featuring a mixture of partisan and swing voters who are resident in electoral districts. We also derive necessary and su¢ cient conditions on primitives that yield the parametric model (1): This gives an exact interpretation of based on the skewness of a particular distribution relevant to partisan and swing voter support.
The building blocks that we use are similar to those of Coate and Knight (2007) , the only other paper of which we are aware that tries to micro-found the seats-votes curve. They too begin with distributions of partisan and swing voters and use their apparatus to look at optimal seats-votes curves for a speci…ed social welfare function. They apply this to U.S. state level data. Their paper links to an earlier literature on optimal partisan gerrymandering in which a party tries to draw district boundaries to maximize its seat share -see, for example, Owen and Grofman (1988) .
The …nal issue concerns the impact of the seats-votes curve on policy. Coate and Knight (2007) adopt a citizen-candidate approach in which each party puts up candidates of a given type who then agree on policy in a legislature. Policy is then a¤ected by the pattern of districting because this has an impact on the composition of the legislature. The mechanism here is somewhat di¤erent. We use a model of electoral competition of the kind introduced by Calvert (1985) and Wittman (1983) . Parties have policy preferences which re ‡ect the views of their partisan supporters. In this framework, districting a¤ects policy by changing the incentives of parties to appeal to swing voters in order to get elected.
The paper contributes to somewhat broader debates about the value and consequences of political competition. 3 A number of commentators have discussed how voters may bene…t from more vigorous competition, but there is no agreed upon framework for studying this issue. A good example is discussion 3 See Stigler (1972) for an early discussion.
of the pros and cons of one-party systems. In his in ‡uential commentary on the one-party south Key (1949) argues that "In the two-party states the anxiety over the next election pushes political leaders into serving the interests of the have-less elements of society," (Key (1949) , page 307.) This was institutionalized in part by partisan gerrymandering in favor of the Democratic party. To study this requires a way of thinking about the underlying forces that shape political advantage. To date, the literature has tended to focus on realized political outcomes, such as seat shares, to measure political advantage. 4 But this is conceptually ‡awed since, in models of strategic party competition, these political outcomes are endogenous. If the parameters of the seats-vote curvef (P ) -can be measured independently of the policy process, then this provides a natural way into modeling the consequences of factors that a¤ect political advantage in favor of a particular party. The framework developed here makes progress on this and suggests a recursive estimation strategy.
The focus of this paper is on bias inherent in districting. This is distinct from the large literature on incumbent bias in congressional elections in the United States. That begins from the empirical observation that congressional legislators enjoy a signi…cantly increased chance of being re-elected over time.
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The policy concern is with whether such bias diminishes the accountability of legislators to the electorate. This makes a lot of sense in an individualistic system like the U.S. where the personal vote matters signi…cantly. In an English context from which we draw our application, parties dominate legislative decision making and this kind of bias is less of an issue. Thus the analysis that we develop is a natural counterpart to the literature on individual legislators. However, these two kinds of bias are conceptually distinct. Moreover, Ferejohn (1977) argued that behavioral change in the electorate rather than redistricting was most likely responsible
Theoretical Preliminaries
We are interested in understanding the incentives for parties to pick policies and how this depends on the relationship between seats and votes. In timehonored tradition, we model two parties competing for o¢ ce by choosing policy platforms. The model will show how the equilibrium policy platforms depend upon on an empirically relevant model of electoral bias.
Preferences and Actions
The economy comprises three groups of citizens denoted by 2 fa; 0; bg. These labels denote the loyalties that the citizens have to two parties -labelled a and b with type '0'citizens being independent, i.e. not attached to a party. We will refer to type 0 voters as swing voters and the others as partisan voters.
The citizens'utility depends on an L-vector of policies y 1 ; :::; y L that a¤ect their utility. The set of feasible policies is denoted by a compact set Y . denote the optimal policy of type .
Politics
Two parties compete for election. We suppose that their memberships comprise only partisan citizens and that they maximize the average welfare of their members. For z 2 [V (0; y (0)) ; V (0; y ( ))], consider the following Pareto for the increase in incumbency bias in the U.S.. 7 The government budget constraint is embodied in Y . 8 This could correspond to a behavioral model of party loyalty -viewing party attachment as something akin to support for a football team -or else it could represent unmodeled …xed policy preferences on key issues such as state ownership.
e¢ ciency problem for 2 fa; bg:
This picks the best level of utility for the party subject to delivering a certain utility level for the swing voters. Letŷ (z; ) be the policies generated by this program.
We model parties as competing by picking utility levels from the range
-anything else would be ex post Pareto dominated: This begs the question of whether parties can commit to o¤ering something other than their ideal policy.
This could be …nessed by assuming that candidate selection is a commitment device as in Besley and Coate (1997) or by assuming that parties play a repeated game with the voters as in Alesina (1988) . 9 Let v be the utility level being o¤ered to the swing voters by party 2 fa; bg. We use to denote the other party. Let V (z; ) = V (ŷ (z; ) ; ) for 2 fa; bg be the policy-related utility of a partisan voter when the other party is in o¢ ce and has o¤ered a utility level of z to the swing voters.
We assume that type a and type b voters remain loyal to their parties. The swing voters weigh up their utility from voting for each party. We model them using a fairly standard probabilistic voting model of the kind used extensively in Persson and Tabellini (2000) . Swing voter utility is a¤ected by two "shocks", an idiosyncratic shock ! which has distribution function F (!) and an aggregate shock with distribution function H ( ). Thus a swing voter with shocks (!; ) prefers party a over party b if:
The …nal component of this expression is the utility di¤erence (v a v b ) between having party a and b in o¢ ce. 9 See Besley (2006) for further discussion.
Votes and Seats
The model can be used to generate a theoretical seats-votes relationship. Suppose voters are distributed in a continuum of equal sized districts. Each district may contain a di¤erent fraction of swing and partisan voters. Speci…cally, suppose that in any particular district, there are voters of type 0 and (1 ) partisan voters. Furthermore (1 + ) =2 of partisan voters support party a in any particular district. Thus > 0, denotes an advantage to party a. We now show how the joint distribution of and across districts a¤ects election outcomes.
First observe that party a wins a seat in which the share of swing voters is and it has an advantage in terms of partisan voters of if and only if:
i.e., it obtains more than half the votes. Rearranging the expression shows that this is so if and only if:
Let G( ; ) be the distribution function of with parameters = ( ; ; )
where is the mean of , is the mean of and is the mean of :
It is now straightforward to see that party a's seat share is given by:
which depends on the the distribution of . Party a's overall vote share is equal to:
Substituting (3) into (2) now yields the following theoretical seats-votes relationship:
where . This reveals the crucial role played by the shape of the distribution function G ( ; ) and its associated parameters : This seats-votes relationship does not depend on the policy choices of the two parties which have been substituted out since they a¤ect both votes and seats in a similar way.
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This implies that the relationship in (4) is identi…ed independently of the policy choices made by parties and underpins the recursive empirical strategy outlined below.
Equation (4) can be used to de…ne electoral bias quite generally as the seat share that party a receives when it obtains …fty per cent of the vote. Thus setting P a = 1=2; bias is de…ned as:
It is clear that the magnitude of the bias depends on how deviates from the median of the distribution of ; i.e. bias is zero when G ( ; ) = (4) is not entirely clear. One approach is to adopt the popular parametric log-odds formulation discussed in section 2 above. To rationalize this in our framework requires …nding a functional form for G ( ; ) such that (4) becomes:
Our main theoretical result derives the conditions under which we can move from (4) to (5) . The result also shows that appropriate parameters, , can be found to rationalize any such seats-votes curve. 12 We state this as:
] if and only if
The critical assumption here is that the policy vector y cannot be targeted to speci…c districts. 1 2 There will typically be many distributions G ( ; ) that can generate a given seat vote curve. All we require for this result is that there there exists one value of .
Moreover the median of the distribution across seats is
where
We prove this proposition as the implication of a result for a more general linear seats-votes relationship (of which (5) is a special case) in Appendix I. 13 The Proposition shows that, for the case where (5) There are three useful and important properties of the function f ( ; ).
First f (0; ) = 0 in which case the median of the distribution equals the mean and there is no skewness in the distribution. Second, f ( ; ) is increasing in and hence is increasing in bias. Third, f ( ; ) is decreasing in and thus skewness is decreasing in responsiveness.
Since (4) is derived from a theoretical model, this result will help to provide a link between the measurement of bias and responsiveness in electoral models and policy incentives. We now show that the parameter m -the median of the distribution G ( ; ) -a¤ects the political equilibrium.
Political Equilibrium
Party a wins the election if it takes half the seats. This requires that be su¢ ciently high that:
is an increasing function of the median of the distribution of . . Then the probability that party a wins the election for …xed
A higher value of increases the probability that party a wins: Moreover, with a su¢ ciently high value of , party a wins for sure.
Parties compete by picking utility levels for the swing voters. A political equilibrium is a pair of promises to the swing voters (ṽ a ;ṽ b ) which form a Nash equilibrium, i.e.
: 1 4 For example, in the case where F ( ) is a uniform distribution on h
At an interior solution, the …rst order conditions are:
for party a and
From these, it is clear that , and hence m, a¤ects electoral incentives. This provides a direct link (using the Proposition above) between seats-votes bias and the choice of policy since, as we saw there, the parameter m depends upon and .
To get a better feel for how the model works, suppose that y is a scalar r ky y k : Solving for the Nash equilibrium, assuming an interior solution 15 , yields equilibrium promises:
This implies that parties o¤er equilibrium policy platforms equal to:
In this caseỹ a andỹ b are both increasing in , i.e. bias towards a leads both parties to move their policy platforms in the direction preferred by party a supporters. Hence in jurisdictions biased towards a, we should see party a moving towards its preferred outcome and in jurisdictions where the bias is towards b, we should see party b moving its policy platform towards outcomes preferred by its core supporters b. This is a key prediction that we test below.
16 1 5 This requires that 0 1 2 a + 1 and 1 1 2 + b 0: 1 6 This example can also be used to think about how policies can be made credible using candidate selection along the lines of Besley and Coate (1997) . Suppose that parties pick
More generally, we can write equilibrium policies predicted by the model as:
for 2 fa; bg and`= 1; :::; L. As in the example, electoral bias as represented by has an e¤ect on policies via its impact onṽ .
While the Euclidean preference model gives a clean and instructive answer, the theoretical direction of electoral bias on any speci…c policy is uncertain a priori. It depends on the policy positions of committed and swing voters on each issue. Ultimately, therefore, it is an empirical question which policies are a¤ected by electoral bias.
6 An Application
Background and Data
Our application comes from local governments (called councils) in England for the years 1973-98. 17 As in many countries, local authorities provide of a variety of public services which have an impact on people's daily lives. They deal with basis a¤ects the legislative bargain and/or leadership election after the election. 1 7 The system is somewhat complex involving a mixture of single and two tier authorities.
There is a single tier of government in London and other metropolitan areas since 1988. Since 1995, there has been a move towards a single tier system throughout England via the creation of shire authorities. However, London and metropolitan areas before 1988 and all shire (rural) areas before 1995 and most of them since responsibilities are split between two levels -a higher level county council and a lower level district council. Where such a split exists the current allocation of functions is roughly as follows. District councils deal with public housing, local planning and development applications, leisure and recreation facilities, waste collection, environmental health and revenue collection. County councils deal with education, strategic planning, transport, highways, …re services, social services, public libraries and waste disposal.
Where there is a single tier it typically covers all of these functions (although in London and public housing, local planning and development applications, leisure and recreation facilities, waste collection, environmental health and revenue collection.
Representatives (called councillors) are elected to serve on a geographical basis.
The basic geographical unit (district) is a ward, generally returning between one and three council members, and usually three. Ward boundaries are determined by a politically independent commission which carries out electoral reviews in each local government area at periodic intervals. 18 In all types of authority, elections are conducted on a …rst-past-the-post basis, returning the candidates with most votes, irrespective of whether or not any gains an absolute majority.
The tax raising power of these local authorities is limited with only around 25% of expenditures being funded by local (property) taxes. The remaining budget is …nanced from (block) grants from central government. There are three main parties competing for o¢ ce -Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrats. They communicate platforms to voters mainly through lea ‡et drops focused on local issues. However, party reputation at the national level may also be a factor in shaping voter loyalties. The Conservative and Labour parties dominate in the national political arena. However, the complexion of local government contests is more heterogeneous. One aspect of this is the relative importance of independent representatives in local politics. We create a catch-all grouping which we call "others" in our data and which comprises independents and other minor parties. Table 1 reports political outcomes for the 150 local authorities that we study.
The table gives the mean of actual political control over our sample period. It also gives the break down of our sample by region and by class of local authority. In spite of restricting the sample to 150 two-party authorities, a broad regional distribution remains as well as a selection of the di¤erent authority types. Since we have four party groupings, there are six possible varieties of political competition. The distribution of the sample over these types among the authorities is also given in the Table 1 .
The main period for which we have "policy data" is 1980-1998. For each 2 0 The results are not sensitive to the exact method used to deal with this. Gelman and King (1994b, Appendix A) discusses some alternatives.
local authority, we have …nance data and expenditure. We also get employment in each local authority administration for full time and part time workers. In addition, we have some background socioeconomic data from the Census and other sources. The main economic controls that we use are (log of) household income in each district, the level of unemployment and the (log of) population.
Since 1994, we have data available on a range of outcomes from the Audit Commission, which was set up in 1992 to monitor the performance of local government. The sample means of the controls and policy variables are given in Tables 1 and 2 .
Empirical Method and Results
The above discussion motivates the following recursive empirical approach. We …rst use data on seats and votes to estimate parameters of the seats-vote relationship and . We then use these estimated parameters to see whether electoral bias a¤ects policy outcomes.
Bias
Let j denote a jurisdiction and an election date. There are four parameters which determine the crucial jurisdictional median m j , namely j ; j ; j ; j .
We assume that j = and j = are common parameters across districts 21 , j = j is indexed by j, the local jurisdiction, but constant over time and we decompose j = j + j into a …xed authority component j and a time-varying authority term jt . We assume jt is an innovation unknown to political agents at the time of policy decisions and distributed identically and independently of ( j ; j ) so that parties can be assumed to take decisions based
We estimate the equation:
The proof of the Proposition in Appendix I establishes that it is always possible to …nd authority speci…c j and common compatible with the estimated seats-vote relationship.
Though it is not necessary to have the same in all jurisdictions, making the assumption here removes an issue of coe¢ cient heterogeneity in the policy regressions.
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The estimated parameters are then used to construct f ( j ; ) which will be used to explain economic policy choices.
The relationship between votes and seats, controlling for local authority e¤ects, is illustrated for the main sample of 150 local authorities and the 108 authorities in the "Labour-Conservative subset" respectively in Figures 1 and   2 . The …gure is constructed by …rst regressing both log odds of seats and log odds of votes on a full set of authority dummies, then plotting the relationship between residuals. In each case, we add both the OLS regression and a semiparametric estimate of the relationship using the same data 22 .. The closeness of the plots suggest a fairly good …t for the linear log-odds relationship between seats and votes.
Results from estimating (8) for elections between 1973 and 1997 are given in Table 3 . As we would expect in a majoritarian system, the control of seats varies more than proportionately with changes in votes, i.e. the responsiveness parameter exceeds one. The point estimate is 1.89 in sample of 150 two party jurisdictions and 2.27 in the smaller sample of 108 Conservative-Labour jurisdictions.
Using the results from (8), we recover the j parameter for each of our local authorities. 23 A Wald test strongly rejects the hypothesis that the values of j are equal across local authorities in either sample. The next step is to use these estimated values of j to construct our measure of districting bias when 2 2 The semi-parametric estimates …t a non-linear relationship to the residuals using locally weighted regression and should be seen as estimates of the more general form:
2 3 For …ve of our local authorities: East Cambridgeshire, Hackney, Islington, Southwark and Surrey Heath, the second placed party received no seats in one or more years. This would not be a problem except for the log formulation of the seats-votes relationship. In these cases, we estimates the bias parameter on the years where seats are not zero for the second placed party and set it to missing in years when the second placed party receives no seats. In practice, this is a very minor issue.
party r controls in local authority j at time t as:
For the sake of illustration, Figure 3 gives the distribution of (average) bias in favour of the controlling party in each local authority for the sample of 150 two-party authorities. Unsurprisingly, this bias tends to be positive -parties are in control more often when bias is in their favour. This is borne out by looking at the di¤erence in political control in districts with bias and …nding that the larger party tends to have bias in its favor.
Policy
Let y r`jt be policy outcome`in jurisdiction j in year t when party r 2 fa; bg is in o¢ ce where`= 1; :::; L. Our basic policy equations are of the form:
where rc are region dummy variables, `c are dummy variables for the type of authority, `t are year dummy variables, rjt = 1 if party r is in o¢ ce in district j in year t, and x`j t is a vector of exogenous regressors varying at the jurisdiction level that also a¤ect policy.
It is plausible to expect swing voters to have more centrist policy preferences.
If this is true, then parties would tend to moderate their policy preferences
when facing less electoral bias in their favor. Thus, our empirical speci…cation allows for districting bias to have a di¤erent e¤ect on policy depending on which party is in o¢ ce as would be the case in theory if parties have di¤erent policy preferences.
The theory suggests that policy choices depend upon the median of the distribution of in jurisdiction j, i.e.
This implies that the error term in (9) contains:
where j is treated as a random e¤ect. We will also allow the distribution of ' r`jt to be heteroskedastic. 24 The actual estimation is laid out in detail in Appendix II. It shows how we deal with two further econometric issues. First, we need to allow for the generated regressor bias in the standard errors due to the fact that j and are estimated in (8) . Second, since there are four parties rather than two, we estimate these policy equations for di¤erent (a; b) pairs in di¤erent jurisdictions.
Moreover, since we are studying competition between the main two parties in every jurisdiction, we need to introduce a third possibility (no overall control) in which neither party has a majority of the seats. This will be the baseline category in the estimations that follow.
We take total local authority expenditures per capita as a core example to illustrate our …ndings. These are reported in Table 4 . We begin in column (1) of Table 4 The coe¢ cients on these controls are sensible -higher grants being correlated with higher expenditures. Column (3) adds in dummies for political control but no interactions between this and bias. Conservative party control reduces expenditures while control by any of the other parties increases it, although not signi…cantly in the case of "other"control. The coe¢ cient on bias falls further in this column, but remains positive and signi…cant, albeit at less than 5%. 2 4 Since we assume a …xed and district-speci…c j Appendix I proves that that it is consistent with theory to have constant and then j deterministically related to j and .
In that case we would interpret the estimated coe¢ cient on f ( j ; ) as coming through j . In that the case the random e¤ect captures authority level speci…c e¤ects germane to the policy in question. If is not constant then j could vary orthogonally to f ( j ; ) and this would be absorbed by the random e¤ects. In this case, we have a random coe¢ cient which induces heteroskedasticity in the error term. Our estimation procedure covers both possibilities.
controls the council. The e¤ect of bias for Labour and Liberal Democratic control is positive and signi…cant. The sign under Conservative party control is negative. Thus bias appears to exaggerate the consequences of party control as measured in column (3). These e¤ects are stronger still when we move to the random e¤ects estimation in column (5) which deals with the full set of issues discussed in the context of equation (9). All e¤ects of bias are larger and more signi…cant. Finally, in column (5), we test the robustness of this …nding to looking only at the Conservative-Labour sub-sample. In this instance, bias leads to an increase in expenditure only in Labour controlled councils. The remaining tables investigate whether these …ndings are an artefact of picking total expenditure as an outcome measure. From now on we report only the GLS speci…cation of (9). Table 5 concentrates on taxes. 26 The …rst column is for the size of the local tax. Council taxes, a form of property taxation, are 2 5 Consistency of our estimates of `r relies on consistency in estimation of the j and therefore on number of observed election cycles used for estimation becoming large in each jurisdiction. In practice the length of this time dimension is fairly small and we need therefore to recognise the possibility of attenuation bias arising at the second stage as a consequence of inaccuracy in the estimation of the districting biases j . Note that, as with classical measurement error, this will make it more di¢ cult for us to establish evidence of an e¤ect.
Appendix II.4 shows that this bias should be a similar proportion of the true value `r across di¤erent policies`and suggests a way to estimate the magnitude of the bias. Applying this formula to results in column (5) suggest that the bias towards zero could be about 49% of the true coe¢ cient for Labour, 35% for the Conservatives, 15% for the Liberal Democrats and 21% for others. 2 6 These data come from an organization called the Audit commission and are for a shorter time period than the data in Table 4 .
interesting as they are set locally and are highly visible to residents. The tax varies according property value with each property assigned to a value band.
As our policy measure, we use the tax on a particular standardized property value (Band D). Column (1) shows that there is a positive and signi…cant e¤ect of bias on the size of this tax under Labour control -a one standard deviation increase in bias leading to a 1% increase in the size of the tax. Column (2) looks at whether bias a¤ects the cost of tax collection. The e¤ect of bias is not signi…cant in this case. Column (3) looks at the percentage of tax collected that is owed to the local authority. There is some evidence here that those jurisdictions with more bias tend to have lower tax collection e¤ort regardless of who controls the local authority.
Having observed in Table 4 that total expenditures are a¤ected by bias, Table 6 looks at their composition. For leisure spending and spending on parks, we …nd e¤ects that parallel the results in Table 4 with Labour favoring higher spending and Conservatives less. For spending on refuse collection it appears that bias under Liberal Democratic control increases spending while they spend less on transportation. These results are consistent with parties having di¤erent policy preferences. In Table 8 , we look at a variety of other policy data from the Audit Commission. Provision of cheap social housing is a typical policy that might appeal to Labour's traditional support but would likely be unattractive to Conservative voters who are more likely to be owner-occupiers. Column (1) shows that more bias under Labour control tends to be associated with greater rent collection in public housing while column (2) shows that there are lower management costs in public housing as bias increases under Labour control. There is weak evidence that bias under Labour control reduces rents on social housing while it increases such rents under Conservative control (column (3)). There is little evidence that bias a¤ects planning and the costs of administering bene…ts (columns (5) and (6)).
Overall, the results provide convincing evidence that bias matters for policy outcomes. Consistent with the theory, the results suggest that parties try to appeal more to swing voters by moderating their "true" party preference when elections are more competitive (electoral biases are reduced). Particularly persuasive in this respect is the …nding that electoral bias increases spending and public employment under left-wing (Labour) control while reducing them under right-wing (Conservative) control.
Concluding Comments
A key function of political economy models is to identify how political incentives shape policy choices. Despite a plethora of theoretical models, there are relatively few e¤orts to build links to empirical estimation. This paper has put forward an approach that links theory and data by exploiting the empirical relationship between seats and votes. The core theoretical idea that is taken to the data is that bias towards one party induced by districting skewed in its favor will make that party more keen to o¤er policies to suit its core supporters rather than swing voters.
To illustrate the usefulness of the approach, the paper has developed an application to English local government data. We show how the key parameters can be identi…ed and used to explain policy. In line with theory, there is evidence that parties moderate their policy stance when they have less bias in their favor.
The results presented here contribute to debates about the consequences of electoral districting. The pattern of districting is one of the key choices in an electoral system and generates signi…cant policy interest. However, this issue has largely been left alone by the new political economy literature. 27 The …ndings in this paper suggest that understanding the policy consequences of districting bias does require exploring its implications for the policy strategies formulated by political parties.
Appendix I Proof of Proposition
The Proposition is proved as an implication of the following lemma.
Lemma. For any 2 R and 2 R + and for any increasing, surjective ; :
Proof. From (3) the widest possible range for
Suppose that (A.1) holds or equivalently and therefore = . Given these values, the mean of must therefore equal . Note that we are free to set G( ; ; The di¤erence between the mean of and is
Using the properties of ( ) and ( ),
. Therefore, by substitution,
using the fact that 1 G 1 ( ; ; 
Appendix II Estimation
Consider estimation of the model for one performance indicator y it in isolation (allowing us to drop the`subscript from the performance equation). Let In matrix form write this as
in an obvious notation.
II.1 Seats Votes Relationship
Let Z 1 = (D 1 p). Then and are estimated at the …rst stage by 0
We use these estimates to construct estimates of the bias variableŝ
where r( ; ) denotes the Jacobian matrix (@f =@ 0 @f =@ ).
II.2 OLS Performance Regressions
Let Z 2 = (Wf X). Then second stage OLS estimates are 0
Hence, as N;
assuming existence of the appropriate probability limits, taken as N ! 1.
Consistent estimators of standard errors, robust to heteroskedasticity, are based upon corresponding sample moments of the residuals (with appropriate small sample degrees of freedom corrections):
Allowing incumbent bias e¤ects to di¤er by party involves extending to a vector of e¤ects on interactions of f ( i ; ) with indicators of party control.
Corresponding variance formulae follow by similar reasoning incorporating the appropriate matrix products.
II.3 GLS Performance Regressions
Note however that there is good reason to expect correlation between observations within authorities because of the common in ‡uence i . This suggests a random-e¤ects structure. Suppose E( i 0 i ) = i and^ i is a consistent estimator of i . Let^ denote the block diagonal matrix constructed in the natural way from the estimates^ i . Then we can calculate a feasible GLS estimator 0
and, as N;
assuming again that the appropriate probability limits exist.
Consistent estimators of standard errors are based upon corresponding sample moments of the residuals:
It remains only to describe the calculation of^ . We set^ i =^ 1 I T2 + 
II.4 Small sample bias
Consistent estimation of requires T 1 ! 1 so that estimation error in^ disappears. For …nite T 1 , estimation imprecision in^ creates an e¤ective measurement error issue at the stage of the performance regressions and therefore small sample attenuation bias in estimates of (and ). Speci…cally, taking the expectation of the leading term in the expression for (A.4)
The proportional bias in estimation of is independent of the performance indicator in question (except in so far as that a¤ects the sample which can be used for estimation).
Note also that a putative estimate of the bias is available since the variance of u can be estimated using the seats-votes data and the …rst stage regression results -speci…cally,û 0û =N T 1 consistently estimates E (u 0 u). This could be used as the basis of small-sample-bias-corrected estimates of and . However, while this should reduce small-sample bias it is not clear how it would a¤ect precision of the estimator and it is quite possible that mean square error could increase. We prefer therefore to report the uncorrected but consistent estimates while noting the possible magnitude of bias implied by (A.5). 
